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ABSTRACT
The market for force in Italy through the 13th to 15th century is examined, through
the medium of contracts between city states and mercenary soldiers. The historical era is
divided into three distinct periods; each period is characterized by a typical contract type.
Based on historical descriptions of these periods, it appears that the transaction costs
associated with hiring private force providers varied significantly from period to period
and regression analysis is performed in an attempt to determine the relationship between
these costs and the number of private soldiers employed by the city states of Milan,
Venice, and Florence in each period. The results of the analysis suggest that the effect of
transaction costs in the market for force may be insignificant when compared to other
considerations, particularly the ability of force providers to appropriate wealth directly.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Introduction to the Problem

As Jack Hirshleifer noted in his 1993 Presidential Address to the Western
Economic Association International, there are two ways for an economic agent to make a
living. She may produce goods which she can then either consume or sell, or she may
take the goods which others produce and sell or consume these. These two different
approaches can be characterized “as the way of production and exchange versus the way
of predation and conflict” (Hirshleifer 1). In the ‘way of production and exchange,’ the
Coase Theorem is seen to hold, with economic agents consistently cooperating with one
another to their mutual benefit (Hirshleifer 10). In the ‘way of predation and conflict,’
economic agents instead seek advantage by simply taking from others. While this
fundamental distinction is acknowledged and addressed in economic literature, there
exists no clear, single explanation as to how these two fundamental approaches interact.
Further, while strides have been made in providing economic explanations for the
workings of certain types of non-productive conflict (such as litigation in order to protect
monopoly rents), explanations for the use of violence, or force, remain relatively
problematic. As it is the market for force which is of interest to this study, use of the
term ‘conflict’ will henceforth be limited to that of the physical or violent variety. I
argue that a deeper understanding of the interaction between these two approaches is
warranted, specifically in regard to the conditions under which one may be expected to
prevail over the other; the northern and central city states of 13th-15th century Italy, a
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period that will be referred to as the city state era (CSE), provide an excellent historical
vantage point from which to gain such an understanding. Of particular interest are the
various contractual relations which existed between the city states and private force
providers (PFPs) during this period as well as the manner in which the amount of force
possessed by private entrepreneurs may have influenced the contractual process.
The typical contract type between city states and PFPs observed during the CSE
varied in terms of length, number of troops contracted for, and the degree to which city
states monitored contractual performance on the part of PFPs (generally in terms of the
number and timing of troop inspections.) While no absolute rule can be said to exist in
terms of matching particular contract types with a given period, as contracts varied in
these characteristics throughout the entirety of the CSE, historians report a general trend
in the types of contracts most commonly observed. In order to facilitate ease of
discussion and study, the market for privately produced force in Italy during the CSE is
here divided into three distinct periods, subsequently referred to as the early, middle, and
late contractual periods.
During the early period, city states contracted with relatively small groups of
mercenaries. The size of these groups varies, ranging from contracts with individuals to
contracts with leaders of companies of 50-100 men. As the period progressed, individual
contracts became rarer and company sized contracts more common. The typical short
contract duration of the early period failed to fully employ private force providers, a
failure which led to the rather chaotic and conflict ridden contractual system which
characterizes the middle period. It is during this middle period that contractual

2

inefficiencies reach their highest level, particularly in term of opportunistic behavior on
the part of PFPs, who became organized into large groups which possessed a capacity for
violence sufficient to appropriate city state holdings through open conflict. The late
contracting period can be regarded as a reaction to these inefficiencies. The typical
contract of this final period marks an attempt by the city states to keep PFPs in
continuous service to the state, while at the same time reducing the size of military
formations under the control of any given entrepreneur and increasing the amount of city
state contractual oversight.
The economic theory of transaction costs suggest that as the transactions costs
associated with procuring a given product on the open market increase, firms demanding
the product will exhibit a tendency to move away from such open market transactions and
toward vertical integration and internal production of the good. A statistical analysis of
the effects of each contracting period on the number and type of troops retained by the
city states indicates that the high transaction costs associated with the middle contracting
period of the CSE do not seem to have been accompanied by such a move away from
open market transactions and, instead, coincided with an increase in the number of
private troops retained by the city states; this thesis offers an economic explanation for
this contra-intuitive result by arguing that while the system of governance necessary to
support a stable contractual relationship between parties was not sound during the middle
contracting period and that opportunism on the part of PFPs was extensive, the potential
costs to city states of overt appropriation by independent military entrepreneurs greatly
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exceeded the admittedly high contractual costs of the period. In short, any contract, no
matter how inefficient and costly, was preferable to no contract at all.
Outline of the Study
The works which provide the historical description of the CSE as it is presented
here are reviewed in Chapter 2. An emphasis is placed on the historical contractual
systems, but some general background, especially in regards to political and military
conditions in Italy during the CSE is forwarded as well. This background is essential to
understanding both the geographic region to which this study is confined, as well as an
understanding of why some types of troops were more likely to be provided by PFPs than
others. In addition, the decision to divide the CSE into three separate contracting periods
is defended in this chapter by referring to the historical sources central to this study. As
the CSE is examined using economic theories of both conflict and contracts, a review of
key works dealing with both of these theories is presented. Finally, as both city states
and PFPs are considered here as Coasian firms, a brief definition of this term is provided
as well.
Chapter 3 describes the methods used to perform the statistical analysis.
Particular attention is paid to the manner in which the data was gathered, as the reliance
on a relatively small number of secondary sources places rather firm limits on the
strength of the conclusions this study can offer. An explanation of the statistical model
developed from this data is also included here.
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The results of the analysis and their meaning are presented in Chapter 4. Chapter
5 contains a discussion of these results and attempts an economic explanation of the
observed phenomenon. A brief conclusion is also provided in this final chapter.
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CHAPTER TWO
CONTEXT
The History
Michael Mallet’s Mercenaries and Their Masters is used as the primary historical
source for this study. Appropriately, the narrative provided by Mercenaries emerges, in
part, out of contractual records documenting the relationship between city states and
private force providers (PFPs) in various incarnations. Mallet’s main focus is on the city
states of Northern and Central Italy during the period running from 1189 CE when Italy
became nominally unified under Henry VI, son of the German Emperor Frederick
Barbarossa, and Constance, daughter to the Norman ruler of Sicily William II (Mallet 6),
to 1530 CE by which time the Italian city state system had been largely absorbed by more
broad European forces and Italian armies bore little connection to those fielded in the 13th
to 15th centuries (Mallet 256). Society and Politics in Medieval Italy by J.K. Hyde
provides a useful supplement to Mallet’s mercenary history. A broader historical study,
it provides a good account of the tensions between the wealthy urban class and rural
nobility which ultimately made the procurement of heavy cavalry through traditional
feudal institutions problematic in the city states of North-Central Italy.
The Northern and Central city states are distinguished from cities in the South
Italy as the southern areas were more strongly and directly influenced by broader
European trends, initially through the governance of the Normans, and the city state as an
independent entity did not truly emerge (Mallet 7). In the case of the Papal states,
practical unification of the territory was achieved under Pope Innocent III starting around
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1200 CE (Mallet 6); by 1268 CE, a strong French influence in the form of the Angevian
dynasty had taken hold and would remain in effect throughout the city state era (CSE)
(Mallet 8). In 1282 CE, Sicily broke away from the Angevins but remained united under
Aragonese rule (Mallet 8). The city of Naples operated as a kingdom rather than a city
state and placed more emphasis on the use of feudal institutions in the raising of armies
than did the cities to the north.
In the northern and central Italy, the rule of Henry VI and then his son Frederick
II was essentially nominal in nature. By 1250 CE, with the city states of north-central
Italy banded together in loose defensive alliances, such as the Milan led Lombard league
and the Florence led Tuscany league, to maintain their de facto independence (Mallet 9),
German Emperors had largely ceased to pursue their Italian claims (Mallet 6). Due to a
number of factors, it is in these city states that the employment of PFPs subsequently
became most intense.
As Mallet notes, “the first factor which has to be considered is... the economic
one” (Mallet 16). The Italian city states were centers of commerce and production and as
a consequence the opportunity costs of employing citizens as soldiers was relatively high,
while at the same time, the cities possessed the wealth necessary to hire professional
troops. As German attempts to control the city states waned, rivalries between the cities
intensified, increasing the demand for soldiers. The incursions by imperial Germany had
been relatively infrequent compared to the near constant conflict which emerged between
the “hundreds of tiny principalities and independent communes” (Mallet 16). In addition,
periodic external shocks to the supply of troops available occurred as portions of the large
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armies which were occasionally deployed in Italy by the German Empire, Hungary, and
the Angevin dynasty “remained as mercenaries of the Italian states” (Mallet 19). In 1360
CE, the Hundred Years War concluded and French and English soldiers migrated to the
conflict rich Italian market in search of employment (Mallet 19). At this time, Italy was
experiencing a rural depression which provided a source a labor for PFPs. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, a number of military technological developments in the 13th
century combined with the social changes brought about through urbanization to make
public procurement of the central element of 13th to 15th century Italian warfare, heavy
cavalry, difficult and costly compared to procuring such units from private providers.
Key among these technological changes was the introduction of more powerful
missile weapons such as the longbow and crossbow to Italian warfare. Both of these
weapons, but especially the longbow, required a degree of specialization which exceeded
that generally possessed by the part time citizen levies which the city states could
internally produce and therefore in of themselves provided incentive for the city states to
switch away from the internal production of force to private production by hiring
professional bowmen (Mallet 19-20). However, the city states were eventually able to
internally produce crossbowmen via systems of militias, while the ability to wield the
longbow effectively proved so difficult to acquire that its use in Italy was generally
limited to relatively rare foreign specialists (English) with many years of training. A
more significant impact of the improvement in bow technology was the effect these
weapons had on the cavalry arm, which now needed to be much more heavily armored in
order to be effective on the battlefield. The costs involved in acquiring such heavy
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armor, the increased number of horses (which tired more quickly because of the increased
weight of the rider and of the plate armor protecting the horses), the support soldiers
necessary to field such a military unit, and, finally, the skill necessary to move and fight
while wearing the armor, all encouraged the development of a specialized, professional
soldier class. Further, the feudal system which provided exactly such a class of soldiery
in regions such as France and England, was no longer operative in the Italian city states
where relations between the city states and rural nobility were often strained at best,
while those nobles operating within city states found that they were best served by
turning their attention towards matters of commerce rather than focusing on martial
skills.
While the explicit division of the CSE into three separate contracting periods is
not a feature of Mallet’s history, the distinct characteristics of each period are well
described. While arranging the CSE into contracting periods does allow for individual
analysis of each period, the arrangement is, to some extent, necessarily arbitrary.
Contractual features presented in this thesis as typical of one period are generally present
to a lesser extent in the other two. Mallet points to the battle of Montaperti in 1260 CE,
in which a largely public Florentine army was defeated by a largely private army fielded
by Siena, as a plausible date to mark the shift by the city states from an emphasis on
internal production of force to the procurement of force from private providers (although,
here again, Mallet is careful to note that such key dates are largely a matter of narrative
convenience rather that singular watershed moments) (Mallet 21). Prior to this date,
private or mercenary soldiers were still an important component of city state armies but
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were generally contracted for individually or in small groups. The small groups usually
consisted of the 3-6 men who comprised a single cavalry ‘lance,’- a unit made typically
up of an armored, mounted soldier and the “small entourage of pages and archers” who
led “the horses and provided covering fire” (Mallet 20). Once the importance of private
troops became apparent, the north-central city states rapidly begin hiring PFPs in
company sized elements where possible. In such cases the contract was between the city
state and the company leader, a military entrepreneur. When company sized elements
could not be hired, the city states continued to contract with individual proprietors and
lances and then grouped these hired individuals and lances into companies for ease of
administration. By hiring PFP companies, the transaction costs of the city states were
reduced as one company contract now took the place of some 50-100 individual contacts.
In addition, the company sized formations under a single military leader became more
militarily efficient as they became accustomed to operating under the direction of a
company leader (Mallet 21). By 1300 contracting for company sized elements was the
norm. During this early contracting period, the contract period was generally from 2-3
months, the length of the traditional campaigning season (Mallet 82). PFPs would be
dismissed after they were no longer needed for active service.
Once the PFPs had become organized into company sized elements, either
through private initiative or by city state employers, dismissing them after the campaign
season rapidly became problematic. The unemployed companies began to group together
into larger bands which posed a significant military threat to the city states. The city
states, while continuing to contract with company sized elements, now found it necessary
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to either contract for military service with these large bands, pay bribes to the bands in
order to be left alone, or engage in open conflict with bands which, in the absence of
paying contracts, tended to appropriate city state lands and wealth. This turbulent stage
can be considered the middle contracting period wherein the transition from short-term to
long-term contracts occurred. During this period, contracting inefficiencies abounded as
the force available to the bands was sufficient to make prevention of opportunism on their
part by their city state employers impossible. In addition, as William Caferro’s
“Mercenaries and Military Expenditure: The Costs of Undeclared Warfare in Fourteenth
Century Siena” makes clear, the internal organization of the bands was loose and
individual companies often disregarded contractual arrangements between band and city
state, engaging in appropriation and extortion- behaviors which obviously would have
made the city states less inclined to deal with the bands than otherwise.
The city states responded to the emergence of the bands by offering longer term
contracts and by enfiefing prominent private military leaders in an effort to bind them to
the state (Mallet 82). Mallet’s history relates that these measures were largely successful.
By 1360, the number of bands in Italy had been reduced to four, all of which possessed a
high degree of internal organization and were well disciplined military formations. In
contrast to the loose bands typical of the middle contracting periods, these ‘great
companies’ could generally be depended on to honor the terms of the contracts they
entered into, and often became affiliated with a specific state for an extended period of
time. Still, the existence of such large private formations was uncomfortable for the city
states, and by 1390 the great companies had largely ceased to operate in the mercenary
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market and what will be termed here as the late contracting period was underway.
During this period, contract length was gradually extended, with contracts being divided
into two parts: the ferma, or set contract period, and the ad beneplacitum, or option
period, during which the city state could retain the services of the PFPs if the state wished
and proper notice was given. By mid-15th century, both the ferma and ad beneplacitum
were usually for a length of six months, and lengths of one year ferma plus one year ad
beneplacitum were not uncommon. These contracts lengths were a significant step
toward private contractors taking continuous service with a particular city state and,
eventually, toward these private troops coming under the complete control of the state
(Mallet 82-83).
Mallet’s history is supported by a number of auxiliary sources. A description of
the contractual history between Italian city states and PFPs in accordance with that of
Mallet’s is offered by Daniel Waley in “The Army of the Florentine Republic from the
Twelfth to the Fourteenth Century.” While his account is limited to Florence, like
Mallet, Waley’s account notes the shift from largely public produced militias in the early
13th century to the more prominent role played by mercenaries in Florentine armies of the
14th century. Waley denotes the period between 1270-1305 as the time frame during
which private forces became grouped into “cohesive companies of cavalry mercenaries”
(Waley 98). Waley also provides a specific accounts. For example, he describes the
formation of a mercenary band numbering some 500 horse along with “considerable...
infantry” forces in 1322-1323 (Waley 106), an occurrence which conforms to the
timetable presented by Mallet. C.C. Bayley’s War and Society in Renaissance Florence,
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which uses Leonardo Bruni’s De Militia, a contemporary account of the Italian military
system during the CSE, as its primary source material, also relates the shift from public
militia based armies, to the central role of PFPs, and finally to the city states attempts to
bring PFPs under public control. Finally, William Caferro’s study of the costs of band
incursions to the city state of Siena provides insight regarding the extent of the problem
posed to city states by marauding bands. In addition, by providing a record of when
Siena’s payments to various bands occurred, Caferro’s Mercenary Companies and the
Decline of Siena is an excellent aid in identifying the time period during which such
bands were most active. Again, the time frame outlined by Caferro conforms well to that
provided by Mallet.
The Economics
Both the city states and PFPs are conceived of here as firms in the manner
described by Ronald Coase in “The Nature of the Firm,” wherein a firm “consists of the
system of relationships which comes into existence when the direction of resources is
dependent on an entrepreneur” (Coase 393). In the case of the PFP, the entrepreneur in
question is the military leader named as such in the contract, the condotteiri. In the case
of the city states, the nature of the entrepreneur is subject to some variation depending on
the exact nature of government. In some cases, such as Milan under the rule of the
signoria, there may indeed have been a single ‘entrepreneur;’ in other cases the idea of
‘government’ must act as a proxy for the individual entrepreneur. Coase quite clearly
addresses the problem at hand, which has to do with the boundary of the firm and where
this boundary occurs. The economic theory forwarded by Coase states that firms “will
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tend to expand until the costs of organizing an extra transaction within the firm become
equal to the costs of carrying out the same transaction by means of an exchange on the
open market” (Coase 395), i.e. theory suggests that city states began hiring PFPs once the
cost of raising such troops internally (which must include the cost of training such troops
as well as any losses resulting from using citizens as soldiers rather than in some
productive capacity) equaled the cost of hiring such troops. As will be seen, while the
costs to the city state of the internal production of force appear to be relatively
straightforward compared to the costs of procuring force via open exchange, as the
transaction costs involved in the market for force tend to be significant, such appearances
are deceptive. When the force possessed by organized PFPs is significant relative to that
possessed by the state, the costs of internal production must include the costs of ‘nontransaction.’ The likely action of unemployed PFPs, overt appropriation of city state
wealth, must be factored into the equation.
An emphasis on transaction costs in regards to the vertical integration versus
market procurement decision is provided by Oliver Williamson in “Transaction-Cost
Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations” and in “The Vertical Integration
of Production: Market Failure Considerations.” Williamson, like Coase, maintains that
there exist two “main alternatives” in terms of the type of “institutional framework within
which the integrity of a transaction is decided... markets and hierarchies” (Williamson(b)
235), where ‘hierarchy’ can be considered synonymous with ‘vertically integration.’
Among the factors which Williamson stresses as key to an understanding of transaction
costs are the concepts of opportunism and uncertainty, both of which play a large role in
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the contractual history of city state and PFP, although it is the costs associated with
opportunism that are stressed here. In addition to the problem of opportunistic behavior
on the part of PFPs employed by the city states, the bands of the middle contractual
period faced their own problem of opportunism as well. Band leaders were often unable
to effectively control various company sized elements which comprised the larger bandsized entities (again, those few bands which did survive into the mid-14th century, the
‘great companies,’ had exceptionally talented leaders who where able to unite their
troops, impose centralized discipline and eliminate the problem of opportunism.)
Williamson stresses that, in many cases, internalization occurs not “on account of
technological economies associated with production but because of what may be referred
to broadly as ‘transactional failures’ in the operation of markets” (Williamson(a) 112);
again, it must be noted that the potential for transactional failures in the CSE market for
force, especially during what has been defined as the middle contracting period were very
large indeed. Yet, as will be seen, even though the PFPs could threaten the viability of
the markets ‘institutional framework’ as they possessed the ability to simply appropriate
city state resources rather than trade for them, this potential did not cause a shift toward
internal production by the city states but rather increased procurement of private troops.
Battles between city states and PFP bands were not uncommon in the middle
contractual period, but the general trend favoring Coasian over conflict solutions is not
particularly surprising from an economic standpoint. Conflict invariably involves the
destruction of otherwise useful resources. City states choosing to internally produce
troops and fight PFP bands rather than hire them would stand to loose X amount of
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wealth to band appropriation, while Y amount of wealth would be consumed by the
fighting. The city state would be better off hiring the band for some amount less than
X+Y, and the band is better off as well as it receives an amount greater than X, the wealth
it could expect to be able to appropriate. While the decision to fight might be made in
cases where the city state expected to be able to neutralize the PFP band at some cost less
than the cost of hiring the band, the information necessary to confidently make such a
prediction of success was no means easy to come by. Jack Hirshleifer’s work illustrates
the difficulties associated with specifying even very simple, theoretical conflict models
(Hirshleifer 92). Such difficulties are magnified considerably when weighing actual
conflict decisions, and a desire to avoid the uncertainty associated with war outcomes no
doubt encouraged city states to transact, even under unfavorable circumstances, rather
than fight.
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CHAPTER THREE
The Data
Observations of troop levels retained by three major city states, Venice, Florence,
and Milan, of the north-central region were obtained through secondary historical
sources. Three sources were used: Michael Mallet’s Mercenaries and Their Masters,
C.C. Bayley’s War and Society in Renaissance Florence, and D. Waley’s “The Army of
the Florentine Republic from the Twelfth to the Fourteenth Century.” The troop number
observations were categorized according to type (whether the troops in question were
infantry or cavalry forces), as well as by source (whether they were privately produced
troops hired by the state on the open market or public troops internally produced by the
state.) In cases where the total number of troops for a city state was given without
exposition regarding their type and/or source, the observation was categorized as
unknown with respect to type and/or source. Each observation consists of the total
number of troops of a particular type possessed by Venice, Milan, or Florence; partial
observations (for example, instances in which the size of a particular private cavalry unit
hired as part of a larger private cavalry component fielded by a state was given, but the
size of the total component was not) were not included in the data set. The data were
also classified according to the contractual period from which an observation was drawn
as well as whether the troops were part of a city state’s standing army or a deployed (or
“active”) force. The data set consists of 52 observations; a table of the raw data is
provided in the appendix (Table A1).
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The Model
In order to estimate the effect of the various classifications (type, source,
contractual period, and activity,) as well as the effect of the interaction of the contract
periods and other variables of interest upon the number of troops in terms of a percentage
change, a linear regression was performed accorded to the following specification:
ln(troops) =

1

+

2

(foot) +

3

(foot* period2) +

6

(private*period2) +

9

(unkprivate*period2) +

12

(unkfoot*period2) +

15

(action*period2) +

(foot*period3) +

(private*period3) +

7

13

16

4

10

8

(action*period3) +

17

(private) +

(unkprivate) +

(unkprivate*period3) +

(unkfoot*period3) +

5

14

11

(unkfoot) +

(action) +

period2 +

18

period3 +

.

The variables are defined as follows:
troops

= the total number of troops of a given classification employed by a state

foot

= an indicator function with a value of ‘1’ if the troops were infantry and
‘0’ if the troops were mounted

private

= an indicator function with a value of ‘1’ if the source of the troops was
private and ‘0’ if the source was public

unkprivate

= an indicator function with a value of ‘1’ if the source of the troops was
unknown and ‘0’ if it is known to have been either public or private

unkfoot

= an indicator function with a value of ‘1’ if it is not known whether the
troops were infantry or cavalry (or a mixture of both) and ‘0’ if the
troop type is known
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action

= an indicator function with a value of ‘1’ if the troops were part of a
deployed force and ‘0’ if they were part of a standing army

period2

= an indicator function with a value of ‘1’ if the observation was drawn
from the year 1321 c.e. or later and ‘0’ if drawn prior to this date

period3

= an indicator function with a value of ‘1’ if the observation was drawn
from year 1390 c.e. or later and ‘0’ if drawn prior to this date.

The natural log of the troop number is used as a proxy for percentage change in
number of troops. The coefficients attached to the unit category variables ‘foot,’
‘private,’ ‘unkfoot,’ ‘unkpriv,’ and ‘action,’

2

,

5

,

8

,

11

, and

14

, indicate the

percentage change to the size of a military element in the early contracting period
associated with these classifications. The coefficients attached to the interactions of these
variables with the ‘period2’ classification,

3

,

6

,

9

,

12

, and

15

, indicate the further

percentage change associated with the various unit categories when the various
classifications apply in the middle contracting period. Likewise, the coefficients attached
to the interactions of the unit category variables and the ‘period3’ classification indicate
the further marginal change associated with the unit categories in the late contracting
period (i.e. the change from the middle to late contracting period for each unit
classification.)
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and

18

, the coefficients attached to the ‘period2’ and ‘period3’

indicators, estimate the overall remaining percentage change in unit size (not including
the period effects’ interactions with other variables) brought about by the change from
the early to middle, and middle to late contracting periods respectively.
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Other Useful Statistics
As an addition to the information provided by the linear regression coefficients,
some general statistical measures were taken in an effort to illustrate the overall general
trend in troop procurement through the CSE. For each period, the observations were
divided into four groups: publicly produced foot soldiers, private foot soldiers, publicly
produced mounted soldiers, and private mounted soldiers. The average size of each
observation for these four groups was calculated and used to calculate the ratio of private
to public troops of each type in each period. In cases where the source of the troops was
unknown, an average was calculated but omitted from the private/public calculation.

20

CHAPTER FOUR
RESULTS
General Results
The results presented in this chapter can be divided into three sections: the effects
of unit category variables, the effects of period classifications, and the effects of unit
category and period classification interactions upon the dependent variable, ‘ln(troops).’
While the variable ‘unkfoot’ was included in the model as a theoretical possibility, no
actual observations were classified as such, and the ‘unkfoot’ variable and both period
classification interactions with this variable were dropped from the regression1. Of the
remaining independent variables, seven, ‘foot*period2,’ ‘private,’ ‘private*period3,’
unkprivate*period3,’ ‘action,’ ‘action*period2,’ and ‘action*period3,’ were not
statistically significant at the 5% level, leaving six statistically significant variables. The
regression yielded an adjusted R-squared value of 0.635.
The results of the regression are presented in tabular form in Table A-2, located in
the appendix. For all five significant variables, the magnitude of the coefficients is quite
large, exceeding an absolute value of ‘1’ (which represents a 100% change in troop
number size) in all cases. These large values represent somewhat of a conceptual
challenge, especially when they are negative as the number of troops cannot, obviously
drop below zero. However, as each effect occurs in conjunction with several others,

1

Observations of ‘0’ troops were also dropped from the data, leaving a total of 50 observations included in
the regression analysis. The ‘0’ observations were included when calculating the average number of troops
by type and source.
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negative percentage changes in the number of troops in excess of 100% are best
understood simply as very strong effects.
Also located in the appendix is Table A-3 which lists average observation sizes
for foot and mounted soldiers for both public and private source classifications. Of most
interest here is the very large value (5.49) for the ratio of privately source mounted
soldiers to publicly sourced mounted soldiers in the middle contractual period. This
figure represents a large increase over the early contractual period.
Results for Unit Category Variables
During the early contracting period, which will be treated as the base period, the
percentage change in the size of associated with the troops being infantry as opposed to
cavalry is 213.4%. The effect of private sourcing on troop size in the early contracting
period (-73.4%) is not significant at the 5% level.
Results for Unit Category and Period Classification Interactions
The coefficients associated with the interaction of unit category variables and
period classifications can be regarded either as marginal changes to the effect of the unit
category variable in the base period (in the case of interactions between unit category
variables and the ‘period2’ variable), or as marginal changes to the effect of the unit
category variable in the base period plus the marginal change which occurred in the
middle contracting period (in the case of interactions between unit category variables and
the ‘period3’ variable.) For example, as noted above, ‘foot’ causes a 213.4% increase in
the number of troops observed. The coefficient associated with ‘foot*period2’ is not
significant and will be disregarded, so there is no marginal change in the percentage
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change in number of troops caused by the ‘foot’ classification in the middle contracting
period. The coefficient associated with ‘foot*period3’ is -2.452, or a -245.2% change.
This value represents the marginal change to the percentage change brought about by the
‘foot’ classification during the middle contracting period, which is itself composed of the
percentage change caused by the variable ‘foot’ in the early contracting period (213.4%)
plus the marginal change cause by ‘foot’ during the middle contracting period (assumed
to be 0%). For the ‘private’ classification the marginal change in the middle contracting
period is 198.5%; the effect in the late contracting period is not significant at the 5%
level.
Results for Period Classifications
The effect on number of troops caused by the ‘period2’ classification is a 129.1%
decrease from the base period. The marginal change to this effect caused by the
‘period3’ classification is a 251.0% increase (i.e. a 121.9% increase in the number of
troops compared to the number in the base period.)
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CHAPTER FIVE
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The Data
Before attempting to ground the results of the regression analysis in economic
theory, some attention to the peculiarities of the data upon which the regression was
performed is warranted. It must be noted that the data are not random. They have been
taken from three historical studies. While it is apparent upon reading these works that
each of the authors has selected values from a larger population, it is equally apparent
that the reported troop numbers have been deliberately selected so as to illustrate a
specific historical point to the reader. As the historical narratives of all three authors,
Bayley, Mallet, and Waley, feature the shifts in predominate contract types (which have
here been simplified to the three distinct contract periods), it seems reasonable to expect
that the values the authors have chosen to report would reflect these contractual
conditions. This expectation makes the failure of the contractual explanation, as evinced
by the regression results, all the more interesting. It suggests that either the authors
lacked a sufficient understanding of transaction cost theory to select data which correctly
illustrate the expected contractual effects, or that such data were simply not to be found.
Observations for the city states of Milan, Venice, and Florence have been
assumed to be comparable for the purposes of this study. All three city states were in the
upper tier of Italian urban centers, with similar populations (Hyde 153). It is noted that
if this assumption does not hold, the values returned by the regression analysis, as well as
the simple averages in Table A-3, must be regarded in a highly critical light. This is

24

especially true as the observations for Milan and Venice are confined entirely to the late
contractual period and therefore it can not be expected that the effects of any asymmetries
between the three city states will ‘average out.’
Variables of Secondary Interest
While the early, middle, and late contract periods are used to separate certain
types of contractual effects, the periods also serve as simple measures of time. The
distinction between troops supplied by PFPs and troops produced by the cities themselves
represented by the ‘private’ variable presumably encapsulates the effects of various
contract types. The effect of any change in conditions from one contract period to
another other than the typical contract type which affected the amount of force employed
by the city states is reflected in the coefficients associated with the variables ‘period2'
and ‘period3.’ Obviously the number and nature of the conflicts the city states took part
in during the respective contractual period will play a large role in determining the sign
and magnitude of these coefficients. Changes in population will also have an effect, with
larger populations naturally leading to larger armies.
As open conflict of one variety or another was ubiquitous through the CSE, no
attempt has been made here to characterize any of one of the contractual periods as being
more conflict intensive than any of the others. As noted in Chapter 2, Mallet describes
the inter-city conflicts of the middle and late contractual periods as occurring more
frequently than those between the city states and foreign invaders, but higher battle
frequency need not occur in conjunction with larger armies. Not all conflicts are of equal
intensity and the type of warfare common in one period may have required more force
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inputs from the city states than the type of warfare common in another. Such an
asymmetry in conflict intensity may be a contributing factor to the observed differences
between the coefficients associated with the ‘period2' (-1.291) and ‘period3' (2.51)
variables. The negative value attached the ‘period2' value could then be, in part,
explained by conflicts during the middle contracting period being of a smaller scale than
those of either the early period or of the late period, while the large positive effect on
troop numbers associated with the late contract period could be attributed to conflicts in
this period being of a very intense type. These scenarios are offered as conjecture- no
measurement of conflict intensity through the contracting periods has been attempted.
A more certain explanation for the negative effect of ‘period2' on troop numbers,
although one that seems unlikely to account for a negative value of such large magnitude,
is population effects. The Black Death struck the city states at the midpoint of the 14th
century with devastating effect (Hyde 178). The attending decrease in population, as
well as the adverse economic effects which accompanied it, no doubt produced a
tendency for city state force size to decrease. The large, positive effect on troop numbers
associated with the ‘period3' variable reflects, in part, the city states’ recovery from the
setback of the plague.
The distinction between infantry and mounted troops is, obviously, very
significant from a military point of view. The effect of the ‘foot’ classification during the
various contracting periods upon troop numbers can therefore be expected to reflect the
art of war as it was practiced in each period, which, in turn was influenced by the social
and political realities which were predominant during a given contractual period. The
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large, positive coefficient on the ‘foot’ variable during the early contracting period
suggests city states during this period maintained relatively large bodies of infantry. This
result is supported by the relatively large average size of foot components (procured both
through private and public sources) during this time (see Table A-3.) The army fielded
by Florence in 1260 at the battle of Montaperti, where 14000 foot soldiers were deployed
along side 1400 cavalry is representative of the type of composition typical of the early
contracting period (Mallet 12). To a large extent, such ratios reflect an emphasis on
communal or citizen armies in which professional soldiers played a limited role, although
the emphasis on professionals increased from 1260 onward (Mallet 13). In addition to
being characterized by short term contracts between city states and relatively small
bodies of men, the early contractual period was a time of transition between a military
system based primary on feudal traditions and a system centered upon autonomous urban
centers. Feudal nobles were increasingly integrated into the urban system and the amount
of cavalry forces provided by these aristocrats decreased significantly (Hyde 82). At the
same time, numerous institutions such as guilds and political parties developed in the city
states during this period, and these organizations assisted in the formation of militias
comprised of urban footmen (Waley 74). These two developments suggest that the
availability of the two troop types was a significant factor in the positive relationship
between the number of troops having been large and the type of troops having been
infantry. Another historical circumstance which likely contributed to the effect of the
‘foot’ classification in the early contractual period was the threat to the north-central city
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states posed foreign (i.e. non-Italian) forces. The role of the city states in such conflicts
was a defensive one, and infantry forces are more suited to defensive operations.
By the late contractual period, the effect of the ‘foot’ classification on troop
numbers is negative. Again, supply effects combined with the nature of warfare during
this period provide an explanation of the observed effect. By this time, there was an
abundance of professional mounted troops available on the market and as the typical
conflict of this period was “inter- city state” in nature. Such conflicts generally involved
offensive, raiding activity on the part of at least one of the parties to war and the shift
away from foot soldiers to cavalry forces is quite understandable (Mallet 146).
I note that there is no need to turn to economic or historic reasoning to explain the
large positive coefficient (1.305) associated with the “unkprivate*period2" variable; it is
likely that in cases where the source of the troops is not provided, the element was
composed of troops provided by PFPs and publicly produced soldiers. The size of the
observation will therefore tend to be larger than observations that are limited to either
publicly produced or privately provided troops.
Variables of Primary Interest: Private as Opposed to Public Formations
This study is primarily concerned with varying contractual effects upon the
amount of private force hired by the state. The fundamental question is as follows: to
what extent can transaction cost economics explain changes in the number of private
troops employed by the city states across periods where different types of contracts
predominated, and to what extent can alternative explanations, rooted in conflict theory,
be resorted to when transaction cost economic theory fails to explain the observed
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phenomenon? Ideally the design of the regression analysis isolates the explanatory
power of the contractual efficiencies and difficulties associated with each contractual
period to the ‘private’ variable and this variable’s interaction with the period
classifications, as the only decision directly affected by the types of contracting solutions
available is whether to hire private troops or produce public ones. It is therefore these
three independent variables that are of the most interest. As confidence in the
coefficients associated with the ‘private’ and ‘private*period3' cannot be established, it is
how the effect of the ‘private’ classification changes from the early contractual period to
the second, represented by the ‘private*period2' variable that is the main focus of this
chapter.
The coefficient on the ‘private’ variable (-0.734) can be regarded as a baseline
reference, significant at the 10% level rather than the 5% level. It suggests that army
components obtained on the market tended to be smaller than components produced
internally by states. This result is supported by the relatively small ration of private to
public infantry forces (0.11) employed by the city states during this early period. Any
number of explanations for this observed effect is possible, but there seems to be no
reason to dismiss the fundamental one forwarded by the economic theory of transaction
costs which states that a firm will purchase a good up until the point where the cost of the
good equals the cost of producing it (Coase 395). All other factors held equal, this
equality of costs occurred when the amount of private force was smaller than the amount
of public force. Even if the coefficient attached to the ‘private’ variable is dismissed
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entirely as insignificant, this equality will hold at some ratio of private to public force,
and the marginal effect of the middle contractual period remains clear.
All three of the historical works used as sources for the regression analysis
describe contractual transaction costs as increasing through the move from the early
contract period to the middle contracting period, as contacts with bands were extremely
difficult to enforce. Transaction cost economics therefore yields the expectation that the
coefficient attached to the ‘private*period2' variable should be negative, reflecting these
increased costs and indicating that maintaining the equality of costs between private
procurement and public production produced a tendency for city states to shift toward
vertical integration of troop production. The large positive coefficient (1.985) on the
‘private*period2' variable confounds this expectation; in order to explain this result,
transaction cost theory must be augmented by conflict theory.
The basic premise that city state raised armies by hiring and producing at the
point where the cost of a unit of force associated with these two methods was equal need
not, and should not, be discarded. The increase in the number of troops brought about by
said troops being private as the transaction costs associated with procuring private troops
increased does not indicate that city states elected to pursue high cost methods of
acquiring force when lower cost methods were available. What it does suggest is that the
costs associated with the contracting inefficiencies that characterize the middle period
were exceeded by the costs of not contracting with PFPs.
The force wielded by large private bands during the middle contracting period
was considerable and was the central factor in increasing the transaction costs associated
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with hiring such bands2. As they possessed enough force to legitimately challenge city
states in overt conflict, it was difficult for city states to effectively reign in opportunistic
behavior (Caferro(a) 220). Bands were subject to reputational effects as those which took
payment and then went on to appropriate from their employers could expect to find their
chances of further employment reduced, and this effect would be expected to limit
opportunistic behavior to some extent. However, the loose organizational structure of the
bands prior to the emergence of the ‘great companies’ made them vulnerable to a free
rider problem: when the smaller, company sized elements which comprised the bands
engaged in appropriation or extortion, the negative reputational effect was bourn by the
entire band, while the individual company received all wealth obtained by violating the
contractual terms.
The key to understanding why more private troops were hired despite these
increased transaction costs lies in the ability of PFPs to appropriate. Generally, the ‘make
or buy’ decision is unhampered by considerations of appropriation, and goods on the
open market which are not bought do not pose a problem to the firm which passes on the
purchase. Force does. PFPs hired in large formations could be expected to engage in
costly opportunistic behavior, substituting public produced troops for PFPs eliminated
this particular costly behavior but essentially guaranteed that the unemployed PFPs
2

It should be noted, however, that the changes in transaction costs caused by the
emergence of the bands were not all positive. As larger numbers of troops could be
obtained by the city states with a single contract, a reduction in transaction costs would
have occurred as fewer contracts were necessary to obtain a given number of troops.
This decrease, however, may have been insignificant when compared to the large
increase in costs caused by increases in opportunistic behavior by the bands.
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would now seek to acquire wealth through overt conflict with the state, which in turn
required the city states to acquire more force themselves. By hiring PFPs, city states
increased the amount of force at their disposal, while at the same time reducing the
amount of external force threatening them. It becomes apparent that the increased
transaction costs of the middle contractual period may have been the lesser of two evils.
These costs, though high, were exceeded by the costs associated with not hiring bands,
either in terms of wealth appropriated by unemployed PFPs or in the increased costs
associated with the necessity of fielding larger armies in order to ward off such
independent operators.
Unemployed force providers represented a problem to European states throughout
the Middle Ages (Hale 86). Generally the problem was containable and manifested itself
through small scale crimes committed by discharged soldiers. The emergence of large,
cohesive private formations in Italy during the CSE magnified the threat and made it
difficult to suppress. While city states, often working together in groups, at times
engaged in direct military confrontation with PFPs (Mallet 32), the effect of the
‘private*period2' variable suggests that often the most efficient course of action available
to the city states was to hire the PFPs rather than fight them.
Conclusion
The contractual story of the CSE provides a large amount of information
regarding the relationship between city states and PFPs. By dividing the CSE into
distinct contractual periods and comparing the typical contract of these periods, it
becomes clear that transaction costs varied considerably from one period to another. But,
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based on the limited investigation performed here, it appears that transaction costs effects
considered in isolation can be contraindicative of actual market outcomes when the
product being bought and sold is force. The ability of PFPs to act independently to
appropriate city state wealth, or at least threaten to do so in order to extort payments, was
a more important factor in the city state’s decision of whether to hire private troops or
whether to produce such troops internally.

33

APPENDIX

Table A-1: Troop Numbers (Categorized)
troops

year

Foot

private

unkpriv

unkfoot

Action

800
200
1400
14300
0
800
600
500
500
400
600
6000
500
1000
500
5000
1000
800
1300
12000
300
1500
500
15000
2000
2000
40
600
1000
10000
3000
4800
4000
0
1500
4000
8000
4000
11000
6000

1260
1260
1260
1260
1260
1288
1289
1289
1289
1289
1289
1289
1302
1302
1302
1302
1310
1312
1312
1312
1325
1325
1325
1325
1341
1342
1342
1343
1343
1343
1351
1356
1359
1359
1363
1363
1363
1364
1364
1397

0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0

0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
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Period 2

Period 3

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1

City
Florence
Florence
Florence
Florence
Florence
Florence
Florence
Florence
Florence
Florence
Florence
Florence
Florence
Florence
Florence
Florence
Florence
Florence
Florence
Florence
Florence
Florence
Florence
Florence
Florence
Florence
Florence
Florence
Florence
Florence
Florence
Florence
Florence
Florence
Florence
Florence
Florence
Florence
Florence
Florence

Table A-1: Troop Numbers (Categorized)(Continued)
4500
1500
1000
5725
1800
19750
5250
16100
8900
2000
6000
10000

1397
1405
1425
1434
1434
1439
1439
1439
1439
1476
1476
1476

1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1

1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0

0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Florence
Venice
Milan
Milan
Milan
Milan
Milan
Venice
Venice
Milan
Milan
Milan

Table A-2: Regression Results
Variable
foot
foot*period2
foot*period3
private
private*period2
private*period3
unkprivate*period2
unkprivate*period3
action
action*period2
action*period3
period2
period3

Estimate
2.134
0.191
-2.452
-0.734
1.985
-1.266
1.305
-0.486
-0.489
1.047
-0.066
-1.291
2.510

Std. Error
0.436
0.629
0.670
0.423
0.678
0.913
0.453
0.710
0.394
0.628
0.978
0.586
0.697

t-statistic
4.895
0.304
-3.661
-1.735
2.930
-1.386
2.882
-0.685
-1.242
1.669
-0.067
-2.204
3.603

Prob> t
0.000
0.763
0.001
0.091
0.006
0.174
0.007
0.498
0.222
0.104
0.947
0.034
0.001

Notes:
1. R-Squared value = 0.732, Adjusted R-squared value = 0.635
2. Number of observations = 50
3. Variable definitions:
troops
foot
private
unkprivate

action
period2

period3

foot*period2

= the total number of troops of a given classification employed by
a state
= an indicator function with a value of ‘1’ if the troops were
infantry and ‘0’ if the troops were mounted
= an indicator function with a value of ‘1’ if the source of the
troops was private and ‘0’ if the source was public
= an indicator function with a value of ‘1’ if the source of the
troops was unknown and ‘0’ if it is known to have been either
public or private
= an indicator function with a value of ‘1’ if the troops were part of
a deployed force and ‘0’ if they were part of a standing army
= an indicator function with a value of ‘1’ if the observation was
drawn from the year 1321 c.e. or later and ‘0’ if drawn prior to
this date
= an indicator function with a value of ‘1’ if the observation was
drawn from year 1390 c.e. or later and ‘0’ if drawn prior to this
date.
= an indicator function with a value of ‘1’ if the source of the
troops were infantry and the observation was drawn from the
year 1321c.e. or later and ‘0’ in all other cases
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foot*period3

private*period2

private*period3

unkprivate*period2

unkprivate*period3

action*period2

action*period3

= an indicator function with a value of ‘1’ if the troops were
infantry and the observation was drawn from the year 1390 c.e.
or later and ‘0’ in all other cases
= an indicator function with a value of ‘1’ if the source of the
troops was private and the observation was drawn from the year
1321 c.e. or later and ‘0’ in all other cases
= an indicator function with a value of ‘1’ if the source of the
troops was private and the observation was drawn from the year
1390 c.e. or later and ‘0’ in all other cases
= an indicator function with a value of ‘1’ if the source of the
troops is unknown and the observation was drawn from the year
1321 c.e. or later and a value of ‘0’ in all other cases
= an indicator function with value of ‘1’ if the source of the troops
is unknown and the observation was drawn from the year 1390
c.e. or later and a valueof ‘0’ in all other cases
= an indicator function with a value of ‘1’ if the troops were part
of a deployed force and the observation was drawn from the year
1321 c.e. or later and a value of ‘0’ in all other cases
= an indicator function with a value of ‘1’ if the troops were part of
a deployed force and the observation was drawn from the year
1390 c.e. or later and a value of ‘0’ in all other cases
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Table A-3: Average Troop Numbers (by Type, Source, and Period) and Source Ratios

avg. troop numbers
private foot
public foot
private horse
public horse
foot: private/public
horse: private/public
unknown foot
unknown horse

early period

middle period

late period

1000
9325
400
833
0.11
0.48
0
0

0
7600
2020
368
0.00
5.49
10000
2833

4500
5500
4575
3900
0.82
1.17
7075
12450

Notes:
1. Troops of unknown source have been omitted from the public/private ratio calculation
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Table A-4: Complete Army Strength Observations
city

date

private foot

private horse

public foot

public horse

unk foot

unk horse

Private
/public

Florence
Florence
Florence
Florence
Milan
Venice

1260
1289
1351
1363
1439
1439

0
1000
unknown
unknown
unknown
unknown

200
400
unknown
unknown
unknown
unknown

14000
5000
unknown
unknown
unknown
unknown

1400
500
unknown
unknown
unknown
unknown

0
0
11000
4000
5250
8900

0
0
4000
1500
19750
16100

0.01
0.25
unknown
unknown
unknown
unknown
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